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CHAPTER 15 
Equity and Equity Practice 
HARRY ZARROW 
§15.1. Specific performance. Specific performance of contracts for 
the sale and purchase of realty was considered again by the Supreme 
Judicial Court during the 1957 SURVEY year. It would seem that this 
subject has been studied and decided in all its facets; yet each year 
problems arise. LeBlanc v. Molloy 1 re-emphasized the proposition 
that while the granting of specific performance may be a discretionary 
power,2 it is traditionally granted in the absence of special circum-
stances. No question was raised as to the fairness of the bargain or 
of the relative position of the parties. The attempt on the part of the 
defendants to escape from their bargain by raising technical defenses 
was promptly perceived and peremptorily denied. 
In Gardiner v. Richards 3 a proceeding was instituted for a declara-
tory decree determining the rights and obligations of the parties 
arising under a written purchase and sale agreement involving land. 
This action in reality adjudicated the plaintiffs' right to specific per-
formance, if desired by them. The agreement in this case differed 
from the usual land purchase contract, since the election to take less 
than "all or nothing" was in the buyer rather than in the seller. 
Prior to the bringing of this proceeding a law action seeking damages 
for breach of this agreement had been instituted, and was still pend-
ing.· The problem of maintaining both actions at the same time was 
not discussed in the opinion. Clearly a party should not be required 
to defend both a law action and a bill in equity seeking specific per-
formance, when both arise from the same contract. Such actions are 
inconsistent and diametrically opposed. In the law action a court 
would have been required to interpret the contract and to define the 
rights and obligations of each party; these same requirements also 
apply when the Court here acted on the petition for a declaratory 
judgment. 
HARRy ZA1UlOW is a partner in the finn of Lian and Zarrow, Worcester, Massa-
chusetts. He is a member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars. 
§15.1. 1335 Mass. 636, 141 N.E.2d 519 (1957). 
2 McConnick v. The Proprietors of the Cemetery of Mount Auburn, 285 Mass. 
548, 189 N.E. 585 (1934). 
3335 Mass. 455, 142 N.E.2d 889 (1957). For further comment on this case, see 
§1l.5 supra. 
4, 335 Mass. at 457, 142 N.E.2d at 890. 
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§15.2. Unfair competition. In Ferrone v. Mucci 1 the Court was 
asked to enjoin competition that violated a restrictive covenant that 
was part of a contract for the sale of a business. Covenants restricting 
competition are found most often in contracts between employers and 
employees,2 and are held valid and enforceable in equity provided they 
are necessary for the protection of the employer, are not injurious to 
the public interest, and are reasonably limited in time and space.3 
When such a restrictive agreement is coupled with the sale of a busi-
ness, however, there is present an additional property right, good will. 
It would seem that in the enforcement of this trade or competitive 
restriction, the courts would tend to favor the buyer more than the 
employer in the employment contracts; the courts have, however, 
applied the same standards in both instances. In the Ferrone case, the 
rule of reasonableness of the area was applied. The case was referred 
to a master whose report "recommended that the negative covenant 
... be modified to a radius of one mile and that the bill of the plaintiff 
be dismissed." 4 The master's report was confirmed but the final de· 
cree entered modified the covenant to a two mile radius. This de-
cree was reversed by the Supreme Judicial Court because there was no 
basis for a conclusion by the trial court different from that reached 
by the master. 
In New England Telephone {b Telegraph Co. v. National Mer-
chandising Corp.fl the Court was asked to restrict competition and 
trade on the grounds that a property right was being infringed and 
invaded and that action on the part of the defendant constituted un-
fair competition and trespass. The defendant's action of which the 
plaintiff complained was the distribution of plastic covers designed to 
fit closely over telephone directories of varying sizes. These covers 
contained, in addition to other information, paid listings of ten or 
twelve local business concerns classified by occupation or business. 
The telephone company furnished its subscribers, without special 
charge, classified advertising of business subscribers. Its revenue from 
the classified advertising is quite substantial. The problem which the 
Court was called upon to resolve was the ever present conflict between 
public and private interests. The Court adhered to the philosophy 
that the public interest is paramount in these matters and that this 
interest is best served by a freely competitive economic system from 
§15.2. 1335 Mass. 87, 138 N.E.2d 601 (1956). See Annotations. 45 A.L.R.2d 
77 (1956), 46 id. 119 (1956). 
2Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 23 N.E.2d 899 (1939); Walker 
Coal and Ice Co. v. Westerman, 263 Mass. 235. 160 N.E. 801 (1928); Sherman v. 
Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 135 N.E. 568 (1922). 
8 Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy. 290 Mass. 549. 195 N.E. 747 
(1935). 
4335 Mass. 87. 138 N.E.2d 601, 602. 
II 335 Mass. 658. 141 N.E.2d 702 (1957). See further comment on this case in 
§26.1 infra. 
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which as many monopolistic restrictions as possible have been re-
moved.6 
Many persons have argued that the general public is best served, 
both as to quality and price, by a competitive system. However, this 
doctrine is not without limits. In the field of public utilities, monopoly 
under government supervision is most desirable. Even in other fields 
of business "cut throat" competition can and does harm the general 
public. Private interests must be protected in the creation of good will 
and reputation by virtue of the quality of their service, as well as by 
their advertising. The public in many instances, in our present-day 
advertising-conscious economy, rely upon a name, a mark, or a symbol. 
A court is then called upon to weigh the various interests and to arrive 
at a proper balance. The interest of free competition has yielded many 
times to the monopolistic restrictions required to prevent "palming 
off" of goods and services and needed to establish and enforce a code 
of business ethics in order to deter the "free ride" and the "dirty 
trick." 7 The Court in the present case properly points out that there 
is no pirating, no deceit of the public, and no appropriation of a trade 
name, a business reputation, a work product, or the distribution 
system of a competitor. 
The Court acknowledged that the scope of equitable relief against 
unfair competition may have been enlarged somewhat by statute in 
this Commonwealth.s This statute has been considered in the federal 
courts but apparently has not been considered at length in the state 
courts. The federal courts have ruled that there is a right to injunctive 
relief under this statute if there is a likelihood of injury to business 
reputation, or the likelihood of dilution of distinctive quality of a 
trade name or trademark.9 The action of the defendant in the present 
case did not fit into either of these categories of liability. 
§15.3. Discovery under equity jurisdiction. The history, the de-
velopment, and the subsequent curtailment of bills for discovery was 
the subject matter of the case of MacPherson v. Boston Edison CO.1 
This case and the problems of discovery are discussed in detail else-
where in this volume.2 
§15.4. Suits between husband and wife. The principle that there 
is jurisdiction in equity of suits between husband and wife to secure 
his or her separate property was confirmed in two cases decided by the 
6335 Mass. at 673, 141 N.E.2d at 711. See Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition, 
53 Yale L.J. 514 (1944). 
7 See Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1940). 
8 G.L., c. 110, §7A, inserted by Acts of 1947, c. 307. 
9 Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Libby, 103 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Mass. 1952); 
Sterling Brewing, Inc. v. Cold Spring Brewing Corp., 100 F. Supp. 412, 416 (D. Mass. 
1951); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1948). 
§15.3. 11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 715, 142 N.E.2d 758. 
2 See §32.1 infra. 
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Court during the 1957 SURVEY year. In the Ramsey case 1 the husband 
obtained a decree which, among other things, enjoined the wife from 
occupying real estate of which the husband was the sole owner. The 
wife contended that a decree of the Probate Court adjudicating that 
she was living apart from her husband for justifiable cause, and which 
made no provision for support, ousted jurisdiction of the Superior 
Court over the subject matter. This contention was dismissed on the 
ground that jurisdiction of the Superior Court over controversies be-
tween husband and wife concerning ownership of property is independ-
ent of the powers of the Probate or the Superior Courts in divorce pro-
ceedings and matters incidental thereto. Prior to 1936 a petition to de· 
termine the wife's property rights could not be engrafted upon a 
divorce proceeding.2 An amendment in 1936 3 conferred general equity 
jurisdiction in divorce and separate support proceedings of causes in 
equity between husband and wife. In the Ramsey case, however, no 
action concerning the wife's property rights had been brought before 
the Probate Court. The question as to whether the Probate Court had 
the power to order the husband (as a part of the provision for support 
of his wife) to permit her to occupy the real estate, and whether such 
decree would have ousted the jurisdiction of the equity court, was not 
in issue because the official decree of the Probate Court was silent in 
this respect. 
Frank v. Frank 4 was another controversy between spouses to deter-
mine their respective rights in property. The basis for the action was 
that a resulting trust had arisen because, although title had been taken 
in the name of the wife, the husband had furnished all of the con-
sideration, and that the presumption of a gift between husband and 
wife was rebutted. The case demonstrates that a resulting trust must 
arise, if at all, at the time of the transfer to the trustee, and that there 
must be present at that time an intent to take a specific or distinct 
interest, an aliquot part, in the property. Ii As the beneficiary in the 
Frank case proved merely an intent to take an undetermined interest, 
his claim failed.6 
§15.5. Breadth of equitable relief. In the early days of the com-
mon law, the only remedy given, with few exceptions, was money 
damages. Equity came into being, as a result of the limitations of the 
harsh and arbitrary common law remedy, to cure this deficiency by 
granting in each case a remedy that would be the most just. This prin-
ciple is brought into clear focus in Douillette v. Parmenter.1 The plain-
§15.4. 1 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 335 Mass. 379, 141 N.E.2d 284 (1957). 
2 Adams v. Holt, 214 Mass. 77, 100 N.E. 1088 (1913). 
3 C.L., c. 208, §33, as amended by Acts of 1936, c. 221, §I. 
4335 Mass. 130, 138 N.E.2d 586 (1956). 
5 Druker v. Druker, 308 Mass. 229, 230, 31 N.E.2d 524, 525 (1941). 
6 Tenczar v. Tenczar, 332 Mass. 105, 106, 123 N.E.2d 359, 360 (1954), discussed 
in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.8. 
§15.5. 1335 Mass. 305, 139 N.E.2d 526 (1957). For further comment on this 
case see §14.l supra. 
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tiff, who was related to the defendant, was induced to build a house 
on land owned by the defendant, on a spot selected by the defendant, 
upon the plaintiff's expectation that the defendant would deed to him 
the land upon which the house was being built. The defendant failed 
to fulfill this expectation. The plaintiff thereupon sued upon an ac-
count annexed for the labor and materials furnished. Since the 
plaintiff could not prove an express or implied promise on the part of 
the defendant to pay for them, the Court held he could not recover_ 
The Court, however, stated that the defendant was unjustly enriched 
at the plaintiff's expense, her conduct was tantamount to fraud, and 
so the conscience of the state required that the plaintiff be afforded 
a remedy. Since the law side of the court has failed, the equity side 
will step in and do justice between the parties by permitting a suit for 
restitution. 
The elasticity of equitable jurisprudence was again demonstrated 
in the case of Belefeuille v. Medeiros.2 Rescission of a sale of a business 
was sought because of fraud. Ordinarily one seeking rescission of a 
transaction must restore or offer to restore all that he has received. 
This rule is quite just and is applied strictly at law. Inability to re-
store what was received is an absolute defense in a law action for 
rescission; in equity, however, the rule is more liberal and rescission 
may be had, even though complete restoration is impossible, provided 
that conditions are imposed that will protect the rights of the defend-
ant. The Court warned, however, that even in equity the requirement 
for restoration is the rule, and rescission without it is the exception.s 
This decision again proves that equity has the capacity to do what is 
fair and just; that it is the conscience of the state. 
2335 Mass. 262, 139 N.E.2d 413 (1957). 
3 Ginn v. Almy, 212 Mass. 486, 493, 99 N.E. 276, 279 (1912). 
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